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Mindanao has been notoriously problematic for con-
quering armies. The island sprawls over nearly one hun-
dred thousand square kilometers, and until well into
the twentieth century much of its interior remained un-
charted. In addition to considerable environmental im-
pediments, Mindanao and the adjacent Sulu Archipelago
were (and still are) home to dynamic Islamic societies
that staunchly resisted colonial incursion. The Span-
ish conquest of the Philippines in the sixteenth century
led to the subjugation and Christianization of Luzon and
the Visayas, yet in the southern Philippines the Iberian
colonizers were only able to establish a fragmentary
series of forts and trading posts along Mindanao’s lit-
toral. Jesuit conversion efforts were violently opposed by
Muslims—called “Moros” by the Spanish—whose memo-
ries of the Reconquista were still fresh.[1] Long stretches
of tense détente between Moro societies and the Span-
ish were punctuated by eruptions of violence, as one
gobernador-general or another decided that the moment
was right to dominate and convert the natives.[2] The
Sulu andMaguindanao sultanates participated in the vig-
orous maritime economy of Southeast Asia, tapping into
the trade networks of China, Singapore, the Dutch East
Indies, and North Borneo. It was not until the late nine-
teenth century that the Spanish, through the use of mod-
ern naval technology, were able to effectively dominate
the Sulu Archipelago. The coastal sultanates became
unanchored from traditional revenue streams as colonial
spatial orders in the region were entrenched, redefining
acceptable commercial practices and suppressing mobil-
ity.[3]
The United States, acquiring Mindanao and Sulu in
the wake of the Spanish-American War, encountered a
region unlike Christianized Luzon or Visayas. At the
time of transfer, Spanish military and political power
barely extended beyond population centers like Zam-
boanga, Jolo, and Cotabato. More important, the Moros
and pagans of Mindanao and Sulu had not experienced
the dizzying cultural impacts of colonial control. While
there were a handful of Moros who had embraced Span-
ish culture, the vast majority continued to be educated by
local panditas (religious figures), looked to their village
datu (tribal chief) for justice, and embraced the syncretic
Malay-Islamic traditions their ancestors had. In an effort
to avoid conflicts in the southern Philippines while bat-
tles with insurgents raged in the North, the Americans
made treaties with some datus and sultans in the early
years of the occupation, and otherwise left restive Moro
populations alone. This changed in 1902-1903, when the
young Captain John Pershing led a series of punitive ex-
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peditions to crush resistant Maranao Moros around Lake
Lanao in the interior of Mindanao. The Lanao campaigns
were followed by the abnegation of the Bates Treaty in
the Sulu Archipelago and anti-outlaw expeditions there.
In Maguindanao (now renamed Cotabato after its pri-
mary town), the anticolonial leader Datu Ali was tracked
and killed with the help of Moro collaborators after he
resisted American colonial prerogatives. Asymmetrical
violence on the part of the military authorities occurred
sporadically, including a massacre on the island of Jolo
where between seven hundred and nine hundred Tausūg
Moros were slaughtered. Meanwhile, the military gov-
ernment of what was known as the Moro Province un-
dertook a variety of educational, commercial, and agri-
cultural schemes in order to transformMuslim and pagan
populations into ideal colonial subjects.[4]
Reliance on a mixture of force and cultural coercion
continued after the end of military rule in 1913, when
civilian officials replaced army officers in governmental
roles and the Philippine constabulary took on the role
of enforcer in the southern Philippines. In the 1920s
and 1930s, the island of Mindanao became enshrined in
the Filipino national imagination as a space of untapped
potential. Settlers from the North, with government
encouragement, began colonizing the island in greater
numbers, and Manila newspapers spoke of vast infras-
tructural projects that wouldmodernize thewilds ofMin-
danao and connect it to the rest of the nation. Christian
Filipinos progressively assumed leadership positions in
the southern Philippines, although some Americans re-
mained in key roles there until the outbreak of war. Mus-
lim populations in Mindanao and Sulu resented Chris-
tian Filipino control, sporadically resisting governmen-
tal imperatives by attacking local authorities (Filipino
schoolteachers were a favored target) and clashing with
the Philippine constabulary. As they saw it, Christian
Filipino domination represented a new colonial threat.
Adding to tensions was Japanese migration to Mindanao
and Japanese migrants’ preponderant role in the hemp
trade. In the lead-up to the SecondWorldWar, the south-
ern Philippines was a fractious space.[5]
The above is the historical backdrop against which
Kent Holmes’s book is set. We shall get to its relevance
shortly. Wendell Fertig and His Guerilla Forces in the
Philippines: Fighting the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945
focuses primarily on the efforts of American and Chris-
tian Filipino guerrilla forces to wage a sustained low-
intensity conflict against the Japanese military in and
around Mindanao during the Second World War. The tit-
ular character in Holmes’s work, Wendell Welby Fertig,
was a mining engineer from Colorado who relocated to
the Philippines in 1936 and worked as a consultant for a
number of firms in Samar and Batangas. A reservist in
the Army Corps of Engineers, Fertig was called to ac-
tive duty in mid-1941 and assisted in the defense and
evacuation of Bataan and Corregidor. Flown out of Cor-
regidor before it fell, Fertig landed in Mindanao. Rather
than continuing on to Australia, where General Dou-
glas MacArthur was establishing his General Headquar-
ters (GHQ), Fertig accepted an offer from Major General
William Sharp, head of the Visayan-Mindanao Force, to
serve as head of engineering. Preparing for the Japanese
arrival, Fertig directed the demolition of bridges, roads,
and other valuable public infrastructure aroundDansalan
and Iligan in northern Mindanao. Japanese forces landed
in northern Mindanao in early May 1942 and Fertig took
to the hills, hiding out in the camp of former soldier
and old Mindanao hand Jacob Deisher along the Lanao-
Bukidnon border. After witnessing American prison-
ers or war being marched along the highway between
Dansalan and Iligan in July, Fertig decided to confront
the Japanese occupation. He linked up with a constab-
ulary officer named Luis Morgan who led a small force
of men and agreed to lead them in military operations
against the Japanese. Morgan, himself the product of a
mixed Filipino-American marriage, realized that having
a USArmy officer heading the guerrilla forcewouldmean
better access to outside support.
The bulk of Wendell Fertig and His Guerilla Forces in
the Philippines is a thematically structured account of
Fertig’s organization. Chapter 3 focuses on the devel-
opment of the Mindanao guerillas, including Fertig’s ef-
forts to gain the support of Filipino elites and the Catholic
Church in Misamis, and his attempts to revive civil gov-
ernment and local businesses after Misamis City fell to
the guerillas. Chapter 4 explores early frustrations main-
taining contact with GHQ in Australia and the eventual
development of Force Radio Command, a series of covert
radio stations that provided important naval intelligence
through their observation of the coasts. Chapters 5 and
6 examine the scope and tactics of both Japanese and
guerilla forces inMindanao. Holmes estimates the gueril-
las had a pool of thirty-six thousand men to draw from
on the island and highlights the roles played by non-
Americans in the organization, including Australian sol-
diers, a Syrian engineer, and a German soldier of fortune.
The second half of chapter 6 is a breakdown of the struc-
ture of the guerilla army and brief descriptions of the sig-
nificant battles they fought in between 1943 and 1945. A
brief but charming section highlights the eclectic boats
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of the “Guerilla Navy,” one of which managed to shoot
down a low-flying Japanese bomber. Chapter 7 is about
logistical support and intelligence collection, in partic-
ular the SPYRON submarine resupply missions coordi-
nated by Chick Parsons. Chapter 8 highlights the im-
portance of Fertig’s organization in providing informa-
tion on themovements of Japanese ships, airfield activity,
road traffic, troop strength, bomb assessments, and other
actionable intelligence. Holmes concludes the book with
a three-chapter assessment of Fertig’s leadership abili-
ties and a reflection on guerilla warfare. While acknowl-
edging some of the criticisms made by subordinates in
the postwar era, Holmes concludes that Fertig managed
to solve the “Moro Problem,” keep his organization free
from corruption, and run the most efficient guerilla force
in the southern Philippines.
The book is strongest when it is describing the lo-
gistics of running a covert operation, something that is
perhaps attributable to the author’s career in the Central
Intelligence Agency. Military detail—divisional organi-
zation, troop strength, types of equipment, intelligence-
gathering techniques—is Holmes’s obvious forte, and
those seeking a practical breakdown of the composi-
tion and activities of the guerilla movement in Mindanao
should seek out this volume. Additionally, the sections
that describe the intricacies of creating a unified military
organization from a patchwork of disparate, oft-feuding
groups (Americans, Filipinos, Moros) is well composed,
as are the personal biographies of many of the men who
served as officers under Fertig. Perhaps the most inter-
esting chapters of the book come near its conclusion,
when Holmes moves away from military analysis and
provides his own reflections of Fertig’s legacy. As the
account makes clear, Fertig often faced difficulties when
dealing with his subordinates. In particular, he clashed
with Clive Childress and Ernest McClish, two of his divi-
sion heads. Decades later, Childress published a scathing
critique of Fertig’s performance as a commander. An
early decision to feign being a general officer sent from
Australia to unite the guerrilla forces was questioned by
many, and some of Fertig’s subordinates resented that a
reservist was in overall command of operations in Min-
danao. Quoting liberally from the accounts by Fertig and
others, Holmes illustrates well the complications of lead-
ership.
We must return, however, to the state of Mindanao
entering the Second World War. The book missteps in
its failure to explore how guerilla activities of the Sec-
ond World War were shaped by the regional history of
the southern Philippines. Muslim problems with Filipino
land ownership in Mindanao, for example, are brushed
off in a couple sentences as illegitimate examples of sell-
ers’ remorse. This reduces what remains an ineffably
complex issue of land, culture, and displacement to mere
bitterness and vendetta. The history of American colo-
nialism in Mindanao and Sulu is only given a few para-
graphs and described in uniformly glowing terms. As
illustrated by Moshe Yegar and others, the transition
to private property among cultures with familial and
communal notions of land ownership was anything but
smooth. Compounding this were the beginnings of a de-
mographic sea change on the island that began in the
prewar years. Encouraged by Christian Filipino politi-
cians in the North, hundreds of thousands (and, after the
war, millions) of settlers came to Mindanao.[6] Various
groups of Moros thus responded in a number of ways to
the coming of the Japanese—some saw it as an oppor-
tunity to reverse increasing Christian dominance in the
southern Philippines, others remained loyal to the Amer-
icans in hopes of better results after the war, and many
simply recused themselves entirely from the conflict. Al-
though briefly mentioning Fertig’s negotiations with the
Lanao Moros, Holmes overlooks the literature that ex-
amines Muslim agency in Mindanao and Sulu during the
Japanese occupation.[7] At the time of the Japanese in-
vasion, the peoples of the southern Philippines were ex-
periencing the turbulence of becoming minorities within
a national body where their avenues to power were
severely circumscribed. One cannot fathom their actions
during the SecondWorldWar without studying this phe-
nomenon.
Furthermore, Holmes’s approach to American-
Filipino relationswithin Fertig’s organization is problem-
atic. In describing the falling out that occurred between
Fertig and his chief of staff Luis Morgan—responsible
for assembling the beginnings of what became Fertig’s
organization—Holmes shrugs off Morgan’s complaints
against his commander as “largely anti-American and
petty personal insults” (pp. 164-165). In fact, if we parse
Morgan’s letter to Fertig through the lens of the colo-
nial racial hierarchies still at play in the Philippines,
we see that Morgan was upset because he, as a mes-
tizo, was passed over for the best supplies in favor of
white Americans, some of whomwere subordinates. One
can see how Holmes interprets this as “petty,” yet seen
through the prism of race the matter is far more nebu-
lous. In the Philippines of the American colonial period,
white men who took Filipino women as girlfriends or
wives (or, more rarely, white women who took Filipino
men as boyfriends or husbands) were ostracized and the
3
H-Net Reviews
children resulting from these couplings were often un-
welcome in white colonial society. Memoirs from the
southern Philippines in the 1920s and 1930s attest to this
phenomenon, as does the broader literature on colonial
métissage.[8] The “petty” complaints of Morgan may
have been just that, but they are also suggestive of the
lingering racial dynamics of a colonial state in which
white Anglo-Saxons were thought to be most capable
and thus reaped the rewards.
The men surrounding Fertig who had lived in the
Philippines prior to the war give the most tangible con-
nections between the guerillas and the history of Min-
danao and Sulu. Frederick Worcester, Fertig’s first in-
telligence officer, receives only passing mention. Yet he
was the son of the famous zoologist-turned-Philippines
specialist Dean Worcester, a man who sat on the Philip-
pine Commission and headed the Department of the In-
terior in Manila for years afterward. An “expert” on the
non-Christian peoples of the Philippines, Dean Worces-
ter had a substantial impact on shaping American poli-
cies and cultural dispositions toward the Moros and pa-
gans of Mindanao. After his death in the 1920s, Worces-
ter’s wife and children remained in the Philippines and
were treated as colonial royalty in Zamboanga.[9] One
cannot help but wonder what sort of cultural knowledge
Frederick Worcester brought to the guerrillas during his
brief stint as intelligence officer. The same could be said
about Jacob Deisher, the ex-soldier who had served dur-
ing the Philippine-American War and remained behind
to make his fortunes afterward. His experiences during
the Japanese occupation, collected in the Deisher-Couch
Papers at the United States Army Heritage and Educa-
tion Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, would have aided
Holmes’s work.[10]
Other issues are more structural in nature. Digres-
sions on MacArthur’s escape from the Philippines and
the Battle of Leyte tangentially relate to the experiences
of Fertig and his men but do not serve Holmes’s story
well, taking the reader away from the guerillas and their
struggles. At times the narrative becomes mechanistic
and devolves into long lists of dispatches or supply runs.
Such material functions best when it is worked into the
text and cited fully in appendices. That said, parts of
Holmes’s story read wonderfully, such as when he is re-
counting the travails of the Davao Penal Colony escapees
or the battlefield stories of the Hansen brothers. It is ev-
ident that Holmes, who shares a familial connection to
theMindanao guerillas, invested a great deal of care in as-
sembling this information and correcting mistakes found
in other material on Fertig.[11]
Wendell and His Guerilla Forces in the Philippines is
appropriate for general and specialist readers and pro-
vides a wealth of information on how Americans and
others creatively responded to a situation where they
were outmanned and outgunned. It is written in the
style of an old-school military history, with great atten-
tion paid to matters of organization, technology, intelli-
gence, and communications. Outside of this, however,
are some useful reflections on the challenges of assem-
bling and leading an unconventional military force, as
well as a commentary on the legacy of Fertig’s orga-
nization in American approaches to covert operations.
Nevertheless, the book misses an opportunity to pro-
vide readers with a more nuanced history of Mindanao
and Sulu during the Second World War. In treating the
American colonial experience in the Philippines as pe-
ripheral, Holmes fails to assess the strategies of collabo-
ration, resistance, and passivity enacted by national mi-
norities caught amid larger struggles, and how these phe-
nomena reverberated in guerilla operations. The topic of
race and its role in shaping interactivities between Amer-
icans, Filipinos, Japanese, Moros, and pagans is also no-
table in its absence. As John W. Dower famously demon-
strated, notions of race and empire were omnipresent in
the Pacific theater.[12] The southern Philippines in 1942
was a contentious and complex region, shaped by succes-
sive colonial encounters, and the arrival of the Japanese
deepened this complexity. Holmes’s book is a welcome
addition to the literature on Mindanao in the twentieth
century, but one hopes that future accounts situate the
wartime careers of men like Fertig within deeper histo-
ries of colonial empire, racial order, and spatial reconfig-
uration.
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